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This paper analyzes the determinants of cross-border asset trade
on cross-country data and a Swedish data set. We focus our anal-
ysis on the impact of the euro for the determinants of trade in
bonds, equity and banking assets. With the help of a theoreti-
cal model, we disentangle the different effects that the euro may
have on cross-border asset holdings for both euro zone countries
and countries outside of the euro zone. We ﬁnd evidence that the
euro implies 1) a unilateral ﬁnancial liberalization which makes it
cheaper for all countries to buy euro zone assets. For bonds and eq-
uity holdings, this translates into approximately 14% and 17% lower
transaction costs; 2) a preferential ﬁnancial liberalization which on
top of the previous effect lowers transaction costs inside the euro
zone by approximately 17% and 10% for bonds and equity respec-
tively; 3) a diversion effect due to the fact that lower transaction
costs inside the euro zone entail euro countries to purchase less
equity from outside the euro zone. Our empirical analysis also sug-
gests that the elasticity of substitution between bonds inside the
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1. Introduction
Financial integration has been one the major trends characterizing the world economy in the re-
cent past and partially explains the increase in cross-border asset holdings. All industrialized countries
have been affected by this process. The creation of the euro can at least partially be interpreted as
affecting this process of ﬁnancial integration but in an asymmetric way for countries inside and out-
side the euro zone. From that point of view, an interesting question is to what extent the euro can
be considered as unilateral or preferential ﬁnancial liberalization. The question is important especially
for countries outside the euro zone but which trade a lot with the euro. If one believes that ﬁnancial
integration and ﬁnancial ﬂows generate gains in terms of risk diversiﬁcation and allocation eﬃciency,
it is important to estimate both the opportunity cost of being outside the euro zone and the cost or
gain of the creation the euro for outsiders.
To analyze these questions we use two data sets: a cross-country one on bilateral asset holdings
and a Swedish data set on both holdings of foreign assets and outﬂows. Sweden is interesting to study
because it is a very open country for both trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows, it is a member of the largest and
most integrated regional trade agreement, the European Union, but at the same time remains an
outsider of the euro zone.
Our paper is very much related to the analysis of Lane (2006) on the impact of EMU on bond
portfolios and Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2007) on portfolio equity investment by euro-area countries.
It also builds on recent papers that have analyzed the ﬁnancial gravity equation such as Portes and
Rey (2005), Portes et al. (2001) and Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007). De Santis and Gerard (2006) also
analyze the impact of EMU on portfolio weights rebalancing and Berkel (2006) on the effect of EMU
on gross German portfolio ﬂows.
Our additional contribution is both theoretical and empirical. Based on the model of Martin and
Rey (2004, 2006), we derive a testable ﬁnancial gravity equation that informs us on the different
potential effects of the euro on cross border asset holdings. Empirically, we analyze, not only the
determinants of bond holdings, but also of equity and banking assets. Also, we attempt to disentan-
gle the different effects that the euro may have on asset holdings for both euro zone countries and
countries outside of the euro zone. In this context, we interpret, somewhat restrictively, the creation
of the euro in terms of a change in transaction costs on cross-border trade in ﬁnancial assets. For
example, the elimination of currency risk had several effects. It decreased transaction costs of trading
across different ﬁnancial markets in the euro zone. It led to more integration of national equity mar-
kets. In particular, due to local currency mandates on many institutional investors, the replacement
of national currencies by the euro meant that the feasible universe for such investors was greatly en-
larged (Lane, 2006). In theory therefore, the euro may have several effects on the cost of transacting
assets: on transactions inside the euro zone, on purchases of euro assets by countries outside the
euro zone and on purchases of non-euro assets by euro countries. As in trade theory, these changes
in transaction costs may also result in diversion. In addition, and as noted by Lane (2006),t h ee u r o
may increase the elasticity of substitution between assets of the euro zone because a single monetary
policy increases the correlation of returns. This actually may have a negative effect on the holdings
of euro assets by countries in the euro zone. The reason is that the increased elasticity magniﬁes
the impact of any remaining transaction cost (due to different legal systems in the euro zone for
example) on cross-border holdings of euro assets in the euro zone. Hence, at least theoretically, it
is not obvious that the euro increases the cross-border demand for assets inside the euro zone. We
attempt to analyze these different effects from a theoretical point of view and quantify those with
the help of cross-country data on asset holdings and Swedish data on foreign asset purchases. We
ﬁnd evidence that the euro affects both transaction costs and the elasticity of substitution but the
effect is different for different classes of assets and also different whether countries are in or out
of the euro zone. Our estimates (which depend on our estimated elasticity of substitution between
assets) suggest that the transaction cost to buy assets from the euro zone are lower by around 17%
for equity and 14% for bonds. This beneﬁts both those countries that are in and outside of the euro
zone. On top of this effect, those countries inside the euro zone beneﬁt from a decrease of transaction
costs for bonds and equities respectively of around 17% and 10%. Hence, for a country inside the euro
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31% and 24% respectively. The euro effect can be interpreted as both preferential and unilateral ﬁnan-
cial liberalization. This resembles some recent results (see Baldwin (2006) and Flam and Nordstrom
(2003)) in the literature on the euro effect on trade in goods. However, contrary to this literature we
ﬁnd no evidence that the euro decreases the transaction cost for euro countries of purchasing equity
outside the euro zone. In fact, for equities we ﬁnd evidence that some diversion takes place in the
sense that euro countries buy less equities from outside the euro zone. This evidence is based on
comparing asset trade between euro countries and Nordic countries in (Finland) and out (Sweden,
Norway, Denmark) of the euro zone. This diversion effect does not come from an absolute increase
in transaction costs for buying assets from the rest of the world but from a relative cost effect. On
Swedish data, we also conﬁrm that the euro works like unilateral liberalization: the portfolio bias
towards the euro zone is found quantitatively large for equity and bond holdings. Interestingly, we
also ﬁnd that this bias is larger for ﬂows than for asset holdings. This suggests that the effect of
the euro was to decrease costs to trade euro assets across borders (which led to an increase of the
turnover).
Finally, our empirical analysis suggests that the elasticity of substitution between bonds inside the
euro zone is higher than between bonds denominated in different currencies. Our estimate is that it
is almost three times higher. This actually depresses cross border asset holdings in the euro zone as
it magniﬁes the negative impact of remaining transaction costs in the euro. We illustrate this effect
for transaction costs generated by the difference in the legal system.
Section 2 introduces a simple theoretical framework in order to generate testable ﬁnancial gravity
equations. We then present empirical evidence on determinants of cross border ﬁnancial asset hold-
ings and in particular the effect of the euro on both insiders and outsiders. We do this by using both
a cross country data set and a data set on Swedish holdings of foreign assets and Swedish capital
outﬂows.
2. Theoretical framework
We use a simpliﬁed version of Martin and Rey (2004, 2006) to derive a gravity equation for in-
ternational trade in assets with ﬁnancial transaction costs.3 There are N countries populated with Li
(i ∈ N) risk averse agents who live for two periods. Agents are endowed with projects and assets cor-
respond to claims on those risky projects. The number of traded assets (nj for country j) is therefore
taken to be exogenous here (in Martin and Rey (2006), it is endogenous). The number of shares per
asset is normalized to one. The cost of an asset issued by an agent in country j and bought by an
agent in country i is p jτij where p j is the price of the asset and (τij − 1) is the bilateral ﬁnancial
transaction cost between the two countries. As in the trade literature, the simplifying assumption is
that this cost takes a iceberg form meaning here that the transaction fee is paid in units of the as-
set itself. We have a very broad interpretation of these transaction costs which include currency risk,
trading and liquidity related costs, taxation differentials, differences in accounting and legal standards,
and information asymmetry.
In the second period, there are Z exogenous and equally likely states of nature (the number of
states of nature is assumed to be larger that the number of traded assets), and the realization is re-
vealed at the beginning of that period after all decisions have been taken. As in Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(1997) and Martin and Rey (2004), the technology implies that each project gives dividends in only
one state of nature. In all other states of nature, the dividends are zero. All risky claims to operating
proﬁts are traded on the stock market at the end of period one, so that each claim corresponds to an
Arrow–Debreu asset. No duplication occurs in equilibrium so that each investment/asset in the world
is unique.4 This modelling introduces a simple incentive for agents to diversify their portfolios.
A representative agent in country i maximizes utility subject to the ﬁrst period budget constraint
(in second period consumption is the dividend of shares purchased in ﬁrst period):
3 See also Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) for a derivation of ﬁnancial gravity equation in a related framework.
4 In Martin and Rey (2006) where the number of assets is endogenous, this is shown to be an equilibrium as agents have no
incentive to replicate an existing asset.N. Coeurdacier, P. Martin / J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (2009) 90–113 93
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which is of the non-expected form introduced by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990). This allows
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (which we assume to be 1 for simplicity) to be different
from the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (1/ε). C1i and C2i are consumption in ﬁrst and second
period respectively. yi is per capita income and silj is the demand by an agent of country i for the
asset of agent l j of country j. Remember that assets are all different in the sense that they give
dividends in different states of nature (this is the reason why agents want to diversify their portfolio
and buy all existing assets) but they are symmetric in the sense that they all give in only one state
of nature. This symmetry implies that the “typical” demand by an agent of country i for an asset of
country j can be denoted as: silj = sij.
Note that for the second period, this utility function is similar to the one introduced by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) to represent preferences for differentiated products and ε can be interpreted as the
elasticity of substitution between assets. In what follows, we impose ε > 1 to have ﬁnancial home
bias and realistic asset demands.
If we call r j = dj/p jZ, the expected return of asset j, the value of the aggregate demand by
country i agents for assets issued in country j is (exclusive of transaction costs):


















Note that as in the trade literature a “price index” Q i speciﬁc to each country appears in the
demand for assets. We can think of it in our context as a ﬁnancial price index for all assets that
compete with the imported asset. It measures ﬁnancial remoteness (see Anderson and Van Wincoop
(2003) and Head and Mayer (2004) for the trade version). A country with a low Q i (for example
because its own ﬁnancial markets are very diversiﬁed and it issues many assets) is a country to
which (for a given relative return and bilateral transaction cost) it is diﬃcult to sell ﬁnancial assets.
Note that an empirical diﬃculty (again common to the trade in goods literature) is that this price
index is supposed to contain all potential asset suppliers in the world.
What are the effects of the euro in this theoretical context? The euro can most obviously be
interpreted as a decrease in transaction costs τij between two countries i and j inside the euro
zone. This should increase the cross-border demand of euro assets by euro countries. Note that this
decreases the “ﬁnancial” price index Qi of the euro countries and therefore exerts a negative impact
on the demand by euro countries for assets outside the euro zone. However, we may also think that
the euro makes it easier for non-euro countries to buy euro assets, which we would interpret as a
decrease in τhj where country j is in the euro but not h. This increases the demand for euro assets.
Symmetrically, the euro could make it easier for euro countries to buy non-euro assets (a decrease in
τjh where country j is in the euro but not h).
Finally, it is intuitive to believe that the euro increases the elasticity of substitution between as-
sets of the euro zone. One reason is that with a single monetary policy the correlation between asset
returns (dividends and even more so interest rates) should increase. This effect cannot be straightfor-
wardly captured in our simple model with a very speciﬁc structure of returns because the elasticity
of substitution between assets is the same for all assets and is the inverse of the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion which is the same for all agents. However, it should still be true that for two countries i
and j, the demand by country j for assets of country i depends on the interaction between bilateral
transaction costs τij and the speciﬁc elasticity of substitution between these two countries εij in the94 N. Coeurdacier, P. Martin / J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (2009) 90–113
following way5: (τij)1−εij. This has important implications. Suppose we divide bilateral transaction
costs into those related to the euro and all others related to cross-border asset transactions that are
not affected by the euro (for example the difference in legal systems among euro zone countries).
For a country pair inside the euro zone, transaction costs are lower so this should exert a positive
impact on their bilateral cross border asset holdings. However, the negative impact of difference in
legal systems τij is magniﬁed by the introduction of the euro if we believe that εij is larger for euro
zone countries.
We are now ready to produce the ﬁnancial version of the gravity equation for the holdings of
assets of country j by country i (ignoring constants and assuming for the moment that the elasticity
of substitution is the same for all countries) which will the base of our empirical speciﬁcation:
log(Assetij) = logLi yi + lognj −(ε − 1)logτij +(ε − 1)logr j +(ε − 1)log Qi. (2)
The ﬁrst term is a size factor and corresponds to the GDP of country i. The second one is the
number of assets in country j. This latter variable may be related to economic size (GDP and market
capitalization) but also to the ﬁnancial sophistication of the country that may be linked to its status
as a recognized ﬁnancial center. In Martin and Rey (2006) where the number of assets issued by a
country is endogenous, it is shown to increase with the income of the country and with ﬁnancial
openness of the country when the country is relatively rich. The third term indicates that transaction
costs between the two countries have a negative impact on asset holdings. The effect depends on
the elasticity of substitution which may be different for different assets: typically higher for bonds
than for equities. The fourth term implies that countries with high expected returns should get more
demand for their assets. The last term is the ﬁnancial price index which is speciﬁc to each country.
Note that only one variable is country pair speciﬁc: the bilateral transaction costs and we will focus
our attention on the determinants of those costs in the empirical section. All other terms are country
speciﬁc. Note also that, in a given class of assets (bonds or equities), the reaction of the demand to
a change in transaction costs depends on ε, the elasticity of substitution between assets. It therefore
assumes that this elasticity is not affected by the change in the transaction cost itself. In the case of
the euro, we will need to relax this assumption as the euro is both a decrease in transaction costs
and potentially a factor that increases the substitutability of assets of the euro zone.
3. Empirical evidence
3.1. Empirical strategy
Following our theoretical model, we propose two identiﬁcation strategies to test Eq. (2).
Speciﬁcation (a). First, we estimate the following equation using only country i ﬁxed-effects (αi). We
use the GDP of country j (GDPj)f o rt h em a r k e ts i z e( nj) of the “destination” country (the country
that sells the asset and imports capital). We also proxy the ﬁnancial sophistication of market (j) by
the ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP (
MktCap
GDP )j. We do not have to proxy the market
size (Liyi) for the “source” country (the country that buys the assets and exports capital) since it is
included in the ﬁxed-effect (αi). Expected returns in country j are approximated by the log of the
average gross equity return in US dollars over the period 1990–2001 (logr j):
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ij exp(δ2euroij +δ3commonlangij +δ4legalij +···)
5 To keep the model tractable, we have to assume that assets have uncorrelated pay-offs. Hence, the elasticity of demand
is only driven by the coeﬃcient of risk aversion. With a more sophisticated stochastic structure, the elasticity of substitution
between assets will also depend on the correlation of their pay-offs and an increase in the substitutability εij between assets i
and j is equivalent to an increase in the correlation of their pay-offs.N. Coeurdacier, P. Martin / J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (2009) 90–113 95
where Distanceij is the bilateral distance, euroij, commonlangij, legalij are dummies that indicate that
both countries belong to the euro zone, share a common language and a common legal system. We
describe these in more detail in the next section.
To analyze the impact of the euro on the elasticity of substitution between assets inside the euro
zone, we will add an interaction term between the euro dummy and the identity of the legal sys-
tem.
The use of ﬁxed-effects in the source country dimension (i) allow us to control for the ﬁnancial
price index Qi. Indeed, as shown by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) (see also Baldwin and Taglioni
(2006)), this strategy allows to control for the “multilateral resistance term” (Q i). Since transaction
costs affect the ﬁnancial price index, the omission of source country ﬁxed-effects might bias the esti-
mated coeﬃcient on our transaction cost variables. This speciﬁcation has the main advantage to keep
variability in two dimensions (country j and bilateral dimension). Strictly speaking, this equation is
the exact counterpart of Eq. (2). This is our preferred speciﬁcation since we control for the ﬁnancial
remoteness of country (i) and we keep a reasonable number of parameters to estimate. However,
without ﬁxed-effect in the country (j) dimension, we might not control perfectly for some unobserv-
able country-speciﬁc factors that can affect international asset holdings. In order to deal with this
issue, we will add a large set of control and dummy variables in the country (j) dimension (ﬁnancial
sophistication, corruption index, presence of tax havens and ﬁnancial centers in the sample and some
regional dummies).
In the second speciﬁcation, we control for ﬁxed-effects in both dimensions.
Speciﬁcation (b). We add ﬁxed-effects in the destination country (j) dimension:
log(Assetij) =αi +αj +(ε − 1)log Zij.
In this case, only the impact of the dyadic variables Zij can be estimated.
3.2. Data description
Our data set concerns the year 2001 and our sample contains 27 “source” countries (j) and 61
“destination” countries (j).6 Using panel data in order to estimate the impact of the euro both across
time and across countries would have been more appropriate but we are restricted by our data set
on international ﬁnancial claims: indeed, data on bonds and equity holdings exist only for one year
before 1999 and for a very restricted number of countries while data on banking assets are full of
zeroes for most countries before 1999.
To estimate the “gravity equation” of bilateral international asset holdings, we use two different
data sources for asset holdings: ﬁrst, we use the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) in
20017 provided by the Imf which geographically breaks down securities holdings (bonds8 and equi-
ties). The associated dependant variables are (Equityij) which is the log- of aggregate equity holdings
in country (j) of investors in country (i) (in US dollars) and (Bondij) which is the log- of aggre-
gate bond holdings in country (j) of investors in country (i) (in US dollars). Second, we use data on
bilateral banking ﬁnancial assets in 2001 provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS)9:
the BIS reports quarterly the international claims of its reporting banks on individual countries, geo-
graphically broken down by nationality of reporting banks. Unfortunately, this dataset includes only
19 “source” countries (j) among the 27 countries used from the CPIS data. The dependant variable
6 We restricted our sample according to missing values on bilateral asset holdings and data availability for control variables.
See Appendix A for a country list.
7 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Data, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm.
8 Bond holdings include Long-Term Debt Securities and Short-Term Debt Securities.
9 See http://www.bis.org/statistics/histstats10.htm. To get more robust results, we averaged quarterly data for portfolio stocks
in 2001. See Appendix A for a more precise description of the BIS dataset.96 N. Coeurdacier, P. Martin / J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (2009) 90–113
(BankAssetij) is the log of banking claims in country (j) held by banks of country (i) (expressed in US
dollars). These data partially overlaps data on negotiable securities since around one third of banking
assets are bonds and equities but include a large part of bank lending (around two thirds) which are
excluded from the CPIS dataset.
We use the log- of “destination” countries Gdp (GDPj) to control for market size.10 The GDP is
expressed in current US dollars. We also control for the ﬁnancial sophistication of the destination
country using the stock market capitalization over GDP.11
We use stock market data (monthly stock prices in US dollars from 1990 to 2001 of the main
stock market index of the country12) to compute the log of the average gross stock returns of country
j (Retj) over the period. We will not use these series of returns to explain bilateral bond holdings
since bond holdings are mainly public bonds but unfortunately we do not have data on bond prices
for a large sample of countries.13
Our focus is on the determinants of the bilateral transaction costs. Since variables related to
the ﬂows of information between markets, bilateral trade intensity and the quality of institutions
have been shown to perform well in gravity equations for asset trade, we include the following de-
terminants of the geographical allocation of asset holdings (see Portes and Rey (2005), Aviat and
Coeurdacier (2007), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004)).
We use the log of distance between the two main cities of country pairs (Distanceij) since it might
proxy for some information related transaction costs between markets (Portes and Rey (2005)).
We use a “Common Language” dummy (CommonLangij) if country i and country j share the same
language.14
We use a dummy for the proximity of legal systems from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998).W ed i s t i n -
guish between “common law” systems (or “English law”), “French law,” “German law” and “Swedish
law.” The dummy variable Legalij equals one when source and destination countries have the same
legal system. Indeed, legal system similarities might also reduce information asymmetries and con-
tracting costs.
We also control for bilateral goods trade between countries. The variable (Tradeij)i st h el o go f
bilateral imports from country (j) to country (i) that is not due to market sizes. In other word, this
is the residual of the regression of bilateral imports on GDPi and GDPj.15 The data on international
t r a d eﬂ o w sc o m ef r o mt h ed a t a s e tChelem (Cepii,P a r i s ) .
We use an index of corruption for the “destination” country (Corruptionj) since it is likely that
hidden bribes reduce transactions in international markets. This index is developed by Transparency
International16 and gives some insights on the degree of corruption as judged by business people,
academics and risk analysts.
To control for the impact of the euro on bilateral asset holdings, we construct the following dum-
mies: euroij is equal to one when both countries belong to the euro zone and zero otherwise, and
euroj is equal to one when the destination country (j) belongs to the euro zone but not the source
10 It may be argued that market capitalization is a better proxy for the Gravity Model of Equity Holdings but none of our
results is affected by this choice. Moreover we control for the ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP. We experimented
with Gdp/Capita in the regressions to better control for the development of ﬁnancial markets but the results were mixed
because of interaction with the corruption variable.
11 We use past data (from 2000) to reduce endogeneity issues.
12 Data on stock returns are from Martin and Rey (2006) and Global Financial Data.
13 However this is less an issue than for equity returns since there is much less variability in bond returns across countries.
One could also argue that equity returns might not be the relevant variable for banking assets given that a large share of
cross-border banking assets is made of bank loans but we cannot provide better data on banking portfolios returns.
14 We also constructed a “Colonial Link” dummy which was equal to one if country (j) was a former colony of country (i)( o r
vice-versa) but this variable was almost never signiﬁcant so we drop it from our regressions.
15 We normalize trade by market size in order to have a correct estimate of the impact of countries GDPs on bilateral asset
holdings. In non-reported regressions, we used exports from (i) to (j) or the average of imports and exports but none of the
results were affected.
16 http://www.transparency.org, “Corruption Perception Index.”N. Coeurdacier, P. Martin / J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (2009) 90–113 97
Table 1
Gravity models on world asset holdings with source country ﬁxed-effects.
Equityij Bondij BankAssetij
(1) (2) (3)
GDPj 1.134*** .875*** .821***
(.080) (.083) (.063)




Tradeij .491*** .185** .376***
(.086) (.090) (.073)
Distanceij −.243** −.592*** −.354***
(.101) (.130) (.117)
Legalij .222** .167 .475***
(.122) (.134) (.112)
CommonLangij .437*** .271 .368**
(.156) (.225) (.174)
Corruptionj −.155*** −.184** −.040
(.053) (.075) (.063)
TaxHaven j 1.192*** .195 .608**
(.422) (.331) (.333)
FinCenterj −.025 .747 1.294***
(.293) (.524) (.293)
euroij .957*** 1.849*** .861***
(.303) (.338) (.299)
euroj .509** .759** .761***
(.269) (.307) (.286)
e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .766 .678 .703
e(F) 120.437 65.308 96.096
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country.
Regional dummies of destination are included but not reported.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.
country (i).17 We will also make some robustness checks by controlling for the impact of the Euro-
pean Union: Eurcomij is equal to one when both countries belong to the European Union.
We add a variable TaxHavenj to control for destination countries with very favorable ﬁscal treat-
ment and FinCenterj to control for the presence of ﬁnancial centers in our data. The variable
(TaxHavenj) equals one if the destination country is considered as a tax haven and zero otherwise.18
Similarly, the variable FinCenterj equals one if the country is considered as a ﬁnancial center. Financial
centers are Luxembourg, Hong-Kong, United Kingdom and Singapore.
Finally, to control for unobservable regional variables that might affect bilateral asset holdings, we
add some regional dummies in the “destination country” dimension. We have ﬁve such dummies:
Europe, North America, Central and South America, Africa, Asia and Oceania.19
3.3. Results
The results of the two speciﬁcations are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The impact of the usual gravity
variables is consistent with those of Portes and Rey (2005), Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) and Lane
17 Note that due to the presence of ﬁxed-effects in the dimension (i), we cannot use a variable that is equal to one when the
country (i) is in the euro but not the country (j).
18 Countries are considered as tax havens according to the classiﬁcation of GAFI (Groupe d’Action Financière). We consider ﬁve
Tax Havens in our sample, namely Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Panama and Ireland.
19 See country list in Appendix A.98 N. Coeurdacier, P. Martin / J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (2009) 90–113
Table 2
Gravity models on world asset holdings with source and destination country ﬁxed-effects.
Equityij Bondij BankAssetij
(1) (2) (3)
Tradeij .393*** .123 .344***
(.067) (.079) (.070)
Distanceij −.420*** −.747*** −.490***
(.095) (.116) (.123)
Legalij .189* .183 .447***
(.104) (.122) (.111)
CommonLangij .497*** .378** .424***
(.129) (.190) (.162)
euroij .372** .917*** .044
(.183) (.196) (.156)
e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .787 .716 .717
e(F) 744.994 312.073 227.545
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Idem, 5% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.
and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). The estimated coeﬃcients on Distanceij,T r a d e ij, CommonLangij and Legalij
all show up with the expected sign and for most regressions are signiﬁcant.
A novel feature of these regressions is that we make comparisons across types of assets. The vari-
ables related to information or legal asymmetries (CommonLangij and Legalij) matter more for equity
holdings and banking assets. This is somehow consistent with the idea that equities and banking as-
sets are more information intensive assets than bonds. This is especially so because most bonds are
public bonds and not corporate bonds. In both speciﬁcations, bilateral equity holdings and banking
asset holdings are more affected by the trade intensity between countries than bond holdings. This
is consistent with two competitive explanations that have been brought by the theoretical literature:
it is likely that trade in goods proxies for some information ﬂows between countries and this is not
surprising that it mainly affects the allocation of information intensive assets. A second explanation
suggested by Coeurdacier (2005), is that buying assets of ﬁrms that compete with local ﬁrms (ﬁrms
that export towards market (i)) are a good hedge against ﬂuctuations in the performance of local
ﬁrms in the presence of portfolio home bias.
The effect of distance on bond holdings is almost twice the effect it has for equity and bank
assets. According to the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, when distance between two markets doubles, bilateral
bond holdings are reduced by 60%, 35% for banking assets and only 25% for bilateral equity holdings.
This might be surprising since according to Portes and Rey (2005) and Portes et al. (2001), distance
proxy some informational costs and then should affect to a lower extent trade in public bonds, which
is the largest part of international bond holdings. However, distance may also proxy for transaction
costs (costs of phone calls, of trading assets outside the local ﬁnancial markets, different opening
hours of markets, ...). In this case it would square well with the theoretical framework developed
in the ﬁrst section. Indeed, if bonds of different countries are better substitutes than are equities
of different countries (because of risk idiosyncratic to the ﬁrm), then we would indeed expect that
the coeﬃcient on transactions costs is higher (in absolute value) for bonds than for equity. In the
theoretical framework, this would translate into a higher elasticity of demand (ε). This interpretation
is strengthened by the fact that other variables that proxy for ﬁnancial transaction costs (ﬁnancial
center, corruption and the euro effect) have (in absolute term) a larger effect on asset holdings in the
case of bonds than in the case of equity.
The euro effect. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation we only include country dummies in the source country
dimension which allows us to analyze the impact of the euro on ﬁnancial trade not only in the euro
zone (through the variable euroij) but also between the rest of the world and the euro zone (euroj).N. Coeurdacier, P. Martin / J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (2009) 90–113 99
Tables 1 and 2 provide two important regularities in the data related to the impact of the euro on
international asset portfolios.
First, the euro works like a unilateral ﬁnancial liberalization: the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on the euroj dummy in Table 1 means that countries outsideoftheeuro-zone hold more assets supplied
in the euro zone than predicted by the usual variables. This is true for both bonds and bank assets and
to a lesser extent for equity. The portfolio bias towards the euro-zone is large: for equities, investors
hold around 60% more euro assets than predicted by the usual gravity variables and this number
goes up to around 100% for bonds and banking assets. These are very large numbers and one may
think that, as for the early Rose effects of the single currency on trade (Frankel and Rose, 2002;
Glick and Rose, forthcoming), they are too large to be true. However, ﬁrst remember that this number
is not driven by the fact that euro countries are more ﬁnancially developed, have better institutions,
are closer to the other main ﬁnancial markets (or more integrated in product markets). We control for
these observable characteristics of euro countries. One could also argue that this result is not due to
the euro but to some empirical regularity among European countries: Europe is for some unobservable
reasons more attractive for investors than other regions in the world. However, we control for regional
dummies of destination and in particular a dummy for “broad” Europe. This variable equals one for
a signiﬁcant number of Central and Eastern European countries but creating two different dummies,
one for Western Europe and the other for Central and Eastern Europe did not change any of the result.
Both dummies were very similar in absolute terms and non-signiﬁcant.20
Second, the euro works like a preferential ﬁnancial agreement. The average country exhibits a euro
bias but this bias is signiﬁcantly larger when the two countries are in the euro zone. Quantitatively
this effect is also very large but varies across speciﬁcations and across assets. We choose to select
the one in Table 2. It should be the best speciﬁcation to measure the impact of bilateral variables
since we control for dummies in both the source and destination dimensions. In this case, the euro
increases by 150% bilateral bond holdings between two euro countries while equity holdings rise by
around 45%. The impact on bank assets is not signiﬁcant. Again, these results hold once we control
for a relatively large set of variables that might be correlated with membership in the euro zone
(trade linkages, geography, ...). Although the value of the estimates of the euro effect looks different
in the two speciﬁcations (Tables 1 and 2), the two speciﬁcations provide very similar quantitative
results: the reason is that the estimates of Table 1 also include the impact of the euro as an unilateral
ﬁnancial liberalization (which also affects euro countries). Hence, the measure of the euro bias within
the euro zone (on top of the unilateral ﬁnancial liberalization) is the difference between the estimates
of euroij and euroj.T h i sy i e l d sv e r yc o m p a r a b l ee s t i m a t e st oTable 2.
The results conﬁrm those of Lane (2006) on the positive role of the euro on bond holdings be-
tween countries of the euro zone. Quantitatively, our estimated effect on bond holdings is however
smaller (150% versus around 230%). We also ﬁnd that the euro effect does not hold only for bonds
but also for equity although with a smaller coeﬃcient. This is not surprising since bonds of different
countries are expected to be closer substitutes than equities, which magniﬁes the impact of a de-
crease in transaction costs due the introduction of the euro. As we argued in the theoretical model
we interpret this result as coming from a higher elasticity of demand (ε) for bonds than for equities
and therefore a larger response of bond holdings to transaction costs.
Interestingly, these two regularities resemble the results obtained in the recent literature (see
Baldwin (2006), Flam and Nordstrom (2003)) on the impact of the euro on trade in goods: the euro
acted as a decrease in transaction costs between euro countries but also between euro countries and
the rest of the world. The former effect is especially true for bonds and to a lesser extent for equity
while the latter is true whatever the type of asset.
We then perform robustness checks on the euro effect. Controlling for a European Union dummy
(which equals one when both countries belong the European Union and zero otherwise) does not
affect our results and the estimated euro effect is actually even larger for equities and not signiﬁcantly
20 We also estimated the model dropping randomly three European countries from the sample of source country since one
might argue that European countries are over-represented in the sample and our estimates might suffer from some selection
bias. The estimates were identical. Actually, even when we drop all euro countries as source countries, the same bias towards
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different for bonds (see Appendix A, Tables 11 and 12). However given the collinearity between these
two variables, one should interpret these results with caution.
One interesting question is also whether the euro effect is simply driven by the absence of
exchange rate risk between members of euro. We test this hypothesis by controlling for bilateral
exchange rate volatility (ExchRateVolij) where ExchRateVolij is the log- of (empirical) bilateral nom-
inal exchange rate volatility computed using monthly data over a ﬁve years window before 2001.
Controlling for nominal exchange rate volatility does not modify our results regarding the effect of
the euro, our estimates are essentially unaffected (see Appendix A, Tables 14 and 15). Surprisingly,
bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility is not a signiﬁcant obstacle to cross-border investment in
equities and bank lending. For bond holdings, we do ﬁnd that exchange rate risk reduces cross-border
bond holdings when we control for ﬁxed-effects in both dimension (although the coeﬃcient is only
signiﬁcant at the 10% level, see Table 15). This result makes sense since bond returns are much more
affected by exchange rate risk than equity returns.21
We also test whether the euro effect is due to the existence of deeper agreements on the taxa-
tion of cross-border capital incomes between euro countries. We use data from Aviat and Coeurdacier
(2007) about the international taxation of capital available for a restricted number of countries.22
Indeed, although most of the countries we study have a residence-based tax system, they charge with-
holding taxes when foreigners repatriate dividends, capital gains or interests. To limit double-taxation,
several bilateral tax treaties regulate those withholding taxes (which makes them on average lower
between euro countries). We use two different variables that describe bilateral withholding taxes on
dividends (and capital gains) and on interests (from loans, deposits or debt securities), respectively
DividendTaxij and InterestTaxij, in percents. The former should discourage bilateral equity holdings
while the latter should discourage bilateral bond holdings and banking assets.23 Although signiﬁcant
(at the 10% level), these variables do not change any of the results on the euro effects (see Table 16
in Appendix A).
Quantifying the euro effect: the equivalent variation in transaction costs. We can now provide quantitative
estimates of the fall in transaction costs associated with the euro. Remember that transaction costs
are lower for all countries (the unilateral liberalization effect) and also for countries within the euro
(the preferential liberalization effect). We call the unilateral variation (decrease) in transaction costs
(
 τj
τj ) and the preferential one (
 τij
τij ). The estimated fall depends on our assumed elasticity of demand
(ε) which may be different for bonds, equities and banking assets.
We use data on bilateral taxation of equity dividends and interests on bonds and banking assets to
estimate this elasticity. According to Eq. (2), the coeﬃcient estimated for the bilateral rate of taxation
should be equal to (ε − 1). According to our estimates of this coeﬃcient24 (Table 16 in Appendix A),
we use the following values: εequity = εbankasset = 4 and εbond = 6.5. As expected, estimates of this
elasticity is higher for bonds than for other assets. These numbers are a bit lower than other estimates
in the literature which found values between 6 and 12 for equities (see Loderer et al. (1991), Wurgler
and Zhuravskaya (2002) and Martin and Rey (2006) for a short survey of those elasticities). However,
the elasticity we estimate is for assets from different countries whereas the literature has focused on
the elasticity between assets of the same country.













While for bonds, we get:
 τj
τj = 14% and
 τij
τij = 17%. For banking assets25,
 τj
τj = 25% and
 τij
τij = 1.5%.
21 The Swedish data will conﬁrm this result with much more robust estimates.
22 Data from bilateral tax treaties; http://www.ibfd.org.
23 Those taxes are far from being negligible, ranging from 0% for some agreements to 40%.
24 Note that we could also estimate this elasticity for equities by using the coeﬃcient estimated for returns. The estimated
coeﬃcient is similar (see Table 1) even though not signiﬁcant.
25 For banking assets
 τij
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Table 3
Gravity models on world asset holdings with source and destination countries ﬁxed-effects.
Equityij Bondij BankAssetij
(1) (2) (3)
euroij .367** .892*** .017
(.184) (.197) (.161)
Legalij-x-euroij .244 .422*** .782***
(.212) (.161) (.157)
Legalij-x-Noneuroij .181 .146 .397***
(.111) (.133) (.120)
e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .787 .716 .718
e(F) 725.473 301.683 208.128
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country.
Control variables are included but not reported.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.
Note that despite apparently larger estimates of the euro effect for bonds than for equities, the
associated fall in transaction costs is of the same order of magnitude since bonds are closer substitutes
than equities. If we use higher values for the elasticity of substitution, we obtain smaller estimates
for the fall of transaction costs due to the euro.26
Quantifying the impact of the euro on the elasticity of substitution between assets.U pt on o w ,w eh a v e
assumed that the elasticity of substitution between the assets is not affected by the euro. However,
as noted by Lane (2006), the euro can be interpreted as both a decrease in transaction costs and
potentially a factor that increases the substitutability of assets of the euro zone. Can we disentangle
these two effects? One way is to introduce interaction terms between the euro and other transaction
costs than the euro itself.27 If the euro increases the substitutability of assets we should then ﬁnd that
the effect of any remaining transaction costs is larger inside the euro-zone. We perform this exercise
for the dividend tax (for equity), the interest tax (for bonds and banking assets) and for the common
legal system. Only the interaction term for the legal system turns out to be signiﬁcant and of the
expected positive sign. This holds for bonds and banking assets but not for equity (see Table 3). The
reason why the most natural transaction costs to analyze this question (dividend and interest taxes)
do not yield any result is that they exhibit extremely little variation inside the euro zone. This is
not the case for the legal system for which cross-country variation exists inside the euro zone. Our
interpretation is that remaining ﬁnancial frictions (such as legal differences) are ampliﬁed within the
euro zone because euro assets are closer substitutes. This evidence suggests that indeed assets from
the euro zone have a higher elasticity of substitution.28
The estimates of Table 3 provide a way to compare elasticities of substitution between two euro
bonds (εbonds
euro ) with respect to the average elasticity (εbonds) between two bonds which are not both















This suggests that the elasticity of substitution between two euro bonds (banking assets) is three
(twice) times larger than for other bonds (banking assets). Such a difference implies that the fall of
26 If we double the value of the elasticity (roughly two standard deviations above the estimated one using international tax
data), we divide by two the estimated decrease in transaction costs.
27 An alternative root would be to introduce interaction terms with the returns of the assets. However, two issues make this
diﬃcult. First, these returns are endogenous and second there is very little variation inside the euro zone.
28 Again, it is possible that assets within the euro zone were already closer substitutes before the introduction of the euro due
to the convergence of monetary policies for instance. Strictly speaking, with our cross-sectional data, we evaluate the difference
between elasticities of substitution inside the euro zone versus outside the euro zone but not their variation over time.102 N. Coeurdacier, P. Martin / J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (2009) 90–113
transaction costs within the euro zone (
 τij
τij ) is actually biased downwards for bonds (and to a lesser
extent for banking assets). On the one hand, the introduction of the euro can be associated with lower
transaction costs between euro countries (direct effect) but on the other hand, a higher elasticity of
substitution ampliﬁes the effect of any remaining friction (indirect effect). Note that the direct effect
enhances asset trade between euro countries while the indirect effect plays in the opposite direction.
Since we found a positive euro effect, clearly the direct channel dominates the indirect one. Our
empirical strategy does not allow us to disentangle properly these two effects (in particular because
we do not observe all frictions between markets) and our measure of the variation of transaction
costs inside the euro zone is somehow the sum of these two effects. However, at least for the legal
costs, we can measure the amplitude of this indirect effect. Given our assumed (εbond), we estimate
that differences in the legal system act like a 2.5% transaction cost. Due to an higher elasticity of
substitution between euro bonds, the effect of these legal transaction costs is multiplied by 3 inside
the euro zone.
Asset trade diversion and the euro? The example of Scandinavian countries. The previous section
provided new results on the euro effect for countries buying assets but not for countries selling
assets. A natural question is whether the introduction of the euro is detrimental for countries close to
the euro zone but not part of it. Note that according to the theoretical model, we should expect such
a diversion effect since EMU decreases the “ﬁnancial” price index of euro countries, which reduces
their demand for assets outside the euro zone.
In other words, do euro countries invest less in countries which have similar characteristics than
the euro countries (geographically close to the euro zone, with similar transaction costs, similar level
of developments, similar diversiﬁcation opportunities,...) but which decided to stay outside of the
euro zone?
The group of Scandinavian countries (namely Denmark, Sweden and Norway) is an interesting
group to test such an hypothesis. This is especially true because Finland joined the euro while the
other Nordic countries did not. Of course, one could argue that these countries did not join the euro
because they were less integrated ex-ante to the euro countries. We should, in this case, perform
double-differences using data before and after the introduction of the euro to test such an hypothesis.
However, given that we do not have time-series data, we will restrict our analysis to simple-difference
estimates. This can be done by adding in the regression an interaction term euroi-Scandj which equals
one when the source country belongs to the euro and the destination is either Denmark, Sweden or
N o r w a y .W ea l s oa d dad u m m yS c a n d j to control for some speciﬁc characteristics of the Scandinavian
countries for the speciﬁcation without destination country ﬁxed-effects.29 Finally, we also add a vari-
able Scandij, which equals one when both countries are Scandinavian countries and zero otherwise
to test some speciﬁc linkages among Scandinavian countries. For this variable, Finland is considered
as a Scandinavian country since we do not want our results regarding the euro to be driven by the
presence of Finland among the euro countries.
The results are shown in Tables 4 and 5. First, the variable Scandj is large, positive and signiﬁcant
(the same order of magnitude than euroj), so on average, countries exhibit a bias towards Scandi-
navian countries for all classes of assets. We do not investigate this question but the existence of
publicly traded large multinationals is a likely reason. However, for equity investment, everything else
equal, euro countries invest less in Scandinavia than the average country. This effect is signiﬁcantly
different from zero and large: according to Table 4 (which should give the most precise estimate),
euro countries invest in equities around 65% less towards these countries than predicted by the coun-
try speciﬁc factors and the usual gravity variables. This “asset trade diversion” seems to hold only for
equity investment, the estimated coeﬃcients for bonds and banking assets being very close to zero
and non-signiﬁcant. This may be because a signiﬁcant portion of bonds in these countries are issued
in euro.
29 In particular, these countries have been historically more integrated to the rest of the world, so we can expect this coeﬃ-
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Table 4
Gravity models on world asset holdings: the case of Scandinavian countries.
Equityij Bondij BankAssetij
(1) (2) (3)
euroj .802*** 1.187*** 1.205***
(.264) (.435) (.338)
euroij 1.222*** 2.296*** 1.335***
(.299) (.424) (.337)
euroi-Scandj −.375** .130 −.064
(.162) (.264) (.136)
Scandj .906** 1.135** 1.156***
(.387) (.552) (.432)
Scandij .339 .666** 1.822***
(.359) (.308) (.296)
e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .769 .686 .723
e(F) 128.78 62.076 111.105
Estimation with source country ﬁxed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard errors. Observa-
tions are clustered within destination country. The control variables of Table 1 and regional dummies of destination are included
but not reported.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.
Table 5
Gravity models on world asset holdings: the case of Scandinavian countries.
Equityij Bondij BankAssetij
(1) (2) (3)
euroij .297* .966*** .070
(.167) (.212) (.155)
euroi-Scandj −.521*** .056 −.080
(.163) (.249) (.134)
Scandij −.159 .733** 1.892***
(.363) (.293) (.295)
e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .788 .717 .725
e(F) 863.301 344.616 329.235
Estimation with source and destination country ﬁxed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard
errors. Observations are clustered within destination country. The control variables of Table 2 are included but not reported.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Idem, 5% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.
As a robustness check, we test whether this lower level of bilateral equity investment from euro
countries towards Scandinavian countries is also observed in Finland. We add an interaction term
euroi-Finj in the previous regression. Indeed, it is possible that the euro bias inside the euro zone
does not apply to Finland, which would suggest that Nordic countries are for some unobservable
reasons unattractive for euro investors. As shown in Table 6,t h i si sn o tt h ec a s e ,t h ee u r ob i a sf o r
equities is actually larger for Finland than for the other euro countries (although not signiﬁcantly
different). This suggests that for equity holdings some trade diversion due to the introduction of the
euro exists. But this does not apply to the other types of assets. We could even speculate that equity
investment from the euro zone in Scandinavia is diverted towards Finland, a country with similar
characteristics but inside the euro zone. Of course, this result must be taken with caution and this
hypothesis should be tested with time-series data.
These results suggest that the European monetary union makes Scandinavian countries which do
not belong to the euro zone less attractive for equity holders of euro countries. However, we cannot104 N. Coeurdacier, P. Martin / J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (2009) 90–113
Table 6
Gravity models on world asset holdings: the case of Scandinavian countries.
Equityij Bondij BankAssetij
(1) (2) (3)
euroij .236 .972*** .058
(.202) (.224) (.165)
euroi-Scandj −.518*** .056 −.077
(.163) (.249) (.135)
euroi-Finj .611*** −.065 .124
(.142) (.162) (.138)
Scandij −.100 .725** 1.910***
(.348) (.288) (.299)
e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .788 .717 .725
e(F) 909.446 355.928 282.779
Estimation with source and destination country ﬁxed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard
errors. Observations are clustered within destination country. The control variables of Table 2 and regional dummies of desti-
nation are included but not reported.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.
really say whether this comes from the elimination of the currency risk or from the creation of an
uniﬁed stock market where the largest ﬁrms of the euro zone are quoted.
Finally, if we argue that euro countries attract relatively more inward portfolio investment from
countries outside the euro zone and invest relatively less in European countries outside the euro
zone, these results do not imply that euro countries should have moved into substantial capital ac-
count surplus following the introduction of the euro. Indeed, our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the
variability of portfolio holdings across countries relative to the average country of our sample in 2001
and does not pretend to shed light on the evolution of global imbalances over time.30
3.4. Swedish data
To test the robustness of some of these results, we now turn to Swedish data on bilateral asset
holdings and bilateral capital ﬂows. These data are available for a larger number of countries and
for more than one cross sectional year. However, we loose some information since we have data on
outward investment from Sweden but not on inward investment (moreover we have only one source
country, namely Sweden).
3.4.1. Swedish asset holdings
Data description. The Riksbank provides data on Swedish asset holdings for a very large sample
of countries (68 destination countries31). This data partially overlap our data on international asset
holdings but includes are larger number of countries and is available for four consecutive years (2001–
2004). Like the CPIS database, we have a disaggregation by types of securities (bonds or equities).
Finally, for comparison purposes, we also include banking asset holdings from the BIS for the same
sample of countries and the same years. For stock returns, we use the annual return (in Swedish
krona) over the year considered. Since data on stock returns are not available for the whole set of
countries, we also present the regression without stock returns (column (2) of futures tables).
30 For instance, it is possible that euro countries have on average increased their outward portfolio investment while attracting
more inward investment (keeping their capital account relatively stable around 1999) but this increase must have been less
pronounced in countries similar to euro countries to be consistent with our view. Similarly, a decrease in inward investment in
the euro area around 1999 would not contradict our view as long as this decrease is less pronounced in the euro area than in
a “similar” country outside the euro area.
31 The original database was even larger but due to data availability for some of the control variables, we restrict our sample
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Table 7
Gravity models on Swedish foreign asset holdings.
equityijt equityijt bondijt bankassetijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDPijt 1.275*** 1.076*** .920*** .766***
(.106) (.121) (.102) (.108)
Ret jt 1.248
(1.375)
Distanceij .362 −.091 −.893** .026
(.313) (.330) (.424) (.273)
Tradeijt .862*** .494** .082 1.085***
(.295) (.272) (.359) (.246)
ExchRateVolijt .143 .057 −.864** −.403
(.411) (.591) (.479) (.336)
Corruptionjt −.201** −.310*** −.566*** −.107
(.084) (.106) (.172) (.103)
euroj .833** .905* 1.257** −.032
(.439) (.532) (.575) (.508)
Legalij 1.273 1.095 .301 .713
(.790) (.689) (1.027) (.825)
FinCenterj 1.401** 1.590** .342 .450
(.652) (.635) (.808) (.877)
TaxHaven j 1.143** .946** −1.346** .244
(.536) (.451) (.566) (.587)
e(N) 150 265 176 255
e(r2) .884 .732 .832 .727
e(F) 31.313 39.5 74.303 45.431
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard errors and time ﬁxed-effects. Observations are clustered within
destination country.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Idem, 5% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.
We keep the same control variables as in the previous section but we had to drop the market
capitalization over GDP variable since this variable is not available for this larger set of countries
over the period 2001–2004. We also had to choose between the common language variable, the legal
variable and the Scandinavian dummy given the large overlap between these variables.32 We decided
to keep the legal one. Note that all variables are now time varying except for distance and the euro,
ﬁnancial center, legal and tax haven dummies.
We also add an additional control variable that might affect bilateral asset holdings: (ExchRateVolijt)
is the log- of bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility, between Sweden (country (i)) with coun-
try (j), calculated with monthly data over a ﬁve-year window before time (t).
Results. The results are shown in Table 7.
Looking only at Swedish foreign asset holdings conﬁrm most of the results presented in the pre-
vious section. The impact of bilateral variables (Tradeijt or Distanceij) gives qualitatively very similar
estimates than found using data on world asset holdings. These variables are estimated with the ex-
pected sign when signiﬁcant and quantitatively the estimates are not signiﬁcantly different from the
ones found in the previous section. We also conﬁrm that the euro worked like an unilateral liberal-
ization for Swedish investors: the portfolio bias towards the euro zone is found quantitatively large
for equity and bond holdings. In particular, the bias of Swedish investors towards euro bonds is larger
than for the average country. The Swedish and the euro bonds markets also seem to be particularly
well integrated.
32 Indeed, countries with a legal system considered as similar to the Swedish one are Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland,
while countries considered as having the same language as Sweden are Denmark and Norway.106 N. Coeurdacier, P. Martin / J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (2009) 90–113
The variable (ExchRateVolijt) shows up signiﬁcantly only for bond holdings. Again, this makes sense
since exchange rate risk is a much larger part of the risk in foreign bond returns than in equity
returns. Quantitatively, this effect is non-negligible and larger than what has been estimated using
cross-country data: raising the bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility by 10% lowers bilateral bond
holdings by 8%. Moreover, as we just said, only a small part of the euro effect seems due to the
stability of euro–krona exchange rate.
3.4.2. Swedish capital outﬂows
Data description. The data on Swedish outﬂows come from the Balance of Payments statistics which
provides data on aggregate asset purchases in international ﬁnancial markets broken down by coun-
tries of destination and by types of assets over the period 1998–2005 (on a quarterly basis). Note that
this data are on capital ﬂows (and not asset holdings) and the comparison with results on holdings
is per-se interesting. Unfortunately, we cannot analyze the determinants of Swedish capital inﬂows
and we must focus our attention on asset purchases by Swedish investors since we do not have the
nationality of Swedish assets buyers. Due to missing data in the beginning of the period for some
countries, we had to restrict the sample to 56 destination countries which are the largest markets.
These 56 countries account for about 99% of total Swedish asset purchases. This dataset gives the
nationality of the counter-party which might be different from the nationality of the asset involved
in the transaction, however we will make the assumption that assets bought by Swedish investors to
an investor in a country have been issued in the same country. This is less an issue for bank loans
but might introduce some measurement errors in the series of equities and bonds purchases. We will
partly control for this with our “FinCenterj” dummies.
The dependant variables “purchaseequityijt,” “purchasebondijt” and “loanijt” are respectively the
aggregate purchases by Swedish investors (country (i)) of equities and bonds in country (j) and the
aggregate loans towards country (j) over the quarter.
Note that this data start in 1998, before the introduction of the euro and before Greece joined
after the other countries (in 2001) so that the dummy eurot is now time varying although with little
time variation.
We use the same control variables as in the previous section: GDPijt which is the log- of the
product of Swedish and country (j)’ GDP, Tradeijt
33 and Retjt.R e t jt is the averaged equity return
over the last four quarters in Swedish krona.34
Like for asset holdings, we also add a measure of bilateral exchange rate risk: (ExchRateVolijt)i s
the bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility. At a given time (t), (ExchRateVolijt) is the log- of the
volatility of bilateral nominal exchange rates calculated with monthly data over a ﬁve-year window
before time (t).
We also control for foreign direct investment ﬂows (FDIijt) to see whether asset purchases and FDI
are complementary or substitutes. Similarly to the trade variable, FDIijt is the log- of bilateral foreign
direct investment outﬂows that are not due to market sizes.35
Results. The results are shown in Table 8. Looking at capital outﬂows does not modify qualitatively
our results. The gravity variables (Tradeijt or Distanceij) shows up with the expected sign (when
signiﬁcant). Compared to the previous section, only bilateral loans gives very different quantitative
estimates. Indeed, they are much more related to the geographical distance (and not so much affected
by trade linkages) compared to the bilateral banking assets. They are also the only bilateral ﬂows to
be weakly (positively) affected by foreign direct investment.
33 As in the previous section, Tradeijt is the part of bilateral trade orthogonal to market sizes. Data on bilateral Swedish trade
were provided by Statistics Sweden and include a larger sample of countries than the CHELEM dataset.
34 We used annual returns rather than quarterly returns to reduce the importance of extreme events like currency or stock
market crashes. Moreover, given data availability on stock markets returns, we also run regressions without this variable to
reduce data attrition (column (2)).
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Table 8
Gravity models on outﬂows from Sweden.
purchaseequityijt purchaseequityijt purchasebondijt loanijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDPijt 1.162*** 1.180*** .975*** 1.343***
(.139) (.102) (.107) (.136)
Retjt 1.085**
(.493)
Distanceij −.471 −.646* .039 −1.580***
(.422) (.330) (.400) (.390)
Tradeijt .635*** .488** .498* −.054
(.235) (.217) (.284) (.233)
FDIijt −.100 −.101 −.033 .272*
(.117) (.108) (.097) (.144)
ExchRateVolijt .199 .360 −2.676*** −.217
(.530) (.438) (.521) (.564)
Corruptionijt −.341*** −.352*** −.101 −.097
(.129) (.117) (.135) (.150)
eurojt 1.146** 1.312*** 1.002*** 3.451***
(.528) (.410) (.376) (.528)
Legalij 2.429*** 2.462*** 2.538*** 2.162**
(.876) (.582) (.699) (1.102)
FinCenterj 2.358*** 2.236*** 1.253*** 2.490***
(.544) (.493) (.485) (.937)
TaxHaven j 1.163*** 1.377*** −1.143*** .793
(.402) (.400) (.323) (.821)
e(N) 766 1105 686 1442
e(r2) .776 .753 .738 .7
e(F) 65.808 62.18 258.859 61.488
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country.
Time ﬁxed-effects are included but not reported.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Idem, 5% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.
With respect to the euro, not surprisingly, we also ﬁnd that Sweden trade in assets much more
with euro countries36 but interestingly, if we compare Tables 7 and 8,t h i se u r ob i a st e n d st ob el a r g e r
for ﬂows than for holdings (at least for equities and loans). This suggests that the fall in transaction
costs due to the euro is partly due to an increase in the liquidity of euro assets which in turn has
increased the turnover on euro assets. We also conﬁrm the impact of bilateral exchange rate volatility
on bilateral bonds ﬂows (but not equity and loans). Finally, we also ﬁnd that bilateral exchange rate
volatility reduces only trading in bonds market but with an higher elasticity for bonds ﬂows than for
bonds holdings.
The euro bias: estimation in the time-dimension. It could be argued that Sweden larger trade in
assets with euro countries reﬂects some unobservable variables which make these countries espe-
cially attractive for Swedish investors and which have nothing to do with the euro. Given the time
dimension of this database on capital outﬂows, we can partly deal with this issue.
As a consequence, we can estimate the euro effect across time as well as across countries, com-
paring Sweden’s asset trade with a euro country with respect to a non-euro country before and after
the introduction of the euro. This can be done by looking at the estimate of our euro dummy once
we control for destination countries ﬁxed-effects.37 In other words, with this strategy, we control for
unobservable speciﬁc factors of euro countries and estimate the change of asset purchases towards
36 Again see Table 13 in Appendix A, for robustness checks with respect to the European Union.
37 The country ﬁxed-effects are assumed to be constant over the period considered. In a non-reported regression, we also
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Table 9
Gravity models on outﬂows from Sweden.
purchaseequityijt purchaseequityijt purchasebondijt loanijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
eurojt −.121 .112 1.035*** 3.097***
(.610) (.563) (.324) (.413)
e(N) 766 1105 686 1442
e(r2) .095 .061 .155 .077
e(F) 10.3 4.674 15.869 15.626
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country.
Destination country ﬁxed-effects and control variables of the table are included but not reported.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
these countries before and after the introduction of the euro. This is however a very restrictive test
since we have very little variability in the time dimension: one year of data just before the intro-
duction of the euro and Greece joining in 2001. The results are shown in Table 9. This conﬁrms that
the euro had a very strong effect on bonds trading as well as on bilateral loans (with comparable
estimates), while the effect on equity purchases is no more signiﬁcant. We see these results as a con-
ﬁrmation of one of the main message of the paper. The euro acted as a decrease of transaction costs
for non-euro countries (like Sweden). This effect is more robust for bonds purchases and loans than
for equities.
4. Conclusion
Can we draw some welfare implications from these empirical results for countries that are outside
of the euro zone? They suggest that the euro has three main effects: 1) a unilateral ﬁnancial liber-
alization which makes it cheaper to buy euro zone assets; 2) a diversion effect due to the fact that
lower transaction costs inside the euro zone lead the countries of the zone to purchase less non-euro
assets; 3) an increase in cross-border asset holding inside the euro zone which is the counterpart of
the diversion effect and corresponds to a preferential ﬁnancial liberalization. The ﬁrst effect should
be beneﬁcial to non-euro countries as it implies that it pays less to diversify risk when purchasing
euro assets. This could be readily demonstrated in the model of our theoretical section. The second
and third effects are the two faces of the same mechanism. The second is clearly detrimental to non-
euro countries. If assets are imperfect substitutes (which our analysis conﬁrms), the lower demand
for non-euro equity (the only asset for which some diversion is suggested by our empirical analy-
sis) implies a lower price of non-euro assets relative to euro assets. This implies an increase in the
cost of capital for ﬁrms outside the euro zone. The increase in cross-border ﬁnancial trade inside the
euro-zone affects non-euro countries in different ways. First, it is at the origin of the diversion effect
already discussed. Second, it constitutes an opportunity cost of not joining the euro zone. A third ef-
fect is not present in our framework but would appear in a model like Martin and Rey (2000) where
the number of assets is endogenous. In such a model, the increase in cross-border demand and price
leads to the creation of new assets and an increase in the possibilities of risk diversiﬁcation (markets
become less incomplete). Another way to say this is that, above the transaction cost effect, non-euro
countries should beneﬁt from the fact that ﬁnancial markets in the euro zone become larger and more
diversiﬁed. However, the price of those assets should also increase due to the increased demand cou-
pled to imperfect substitution and transaction costs. Overall, non-euro countries should beneﬁt from
more and cheaper (in terms of transaction costs) opportunities to diversify ﬁnancial risk but with a
deterioration of their ﬁnancial terms of trade.
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Appendix A
A.1. Data description
• International Data on Bilateral Securities Holdings:
Aggregate bilateral bonds and equities holdings in US dollars, in 2001, from the Coordinated Port-
folio Investment Survey, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm.
• Bilateral Financial Banking Assets: in US dollars, average over quarterly data in 2001, from the
Bank of International Settlements.
A disaggregation by sector shows that banking assets are for half interbank assets, the rest is
ﬁnancing of the corporate sector (35%) and of the public sector (15%). A disaggregation by types
of assets show that a big part is loan and deposit (around two thirds) but a non-negligible part
consist in negotiable securities (bonds and equities38).
See Table 10 for a more precise description.
• Bilateral Exports and Imports: in 2001, in US dollars from the CHELEM dataset (Centres d’Etudes
Propectives et d’Informations Internationales, CEPII, Paris).
• GDP: from the International Financial Statistics (Gdp in US dollars in 2001, exchange rates used
are also from the IFS.)
• Bilateral Distance: in km, from S.-J. Wei’s website and from various sources (“How far is it?,”
http://www.indo.com/distance).
• Corruption: “Corruption Perception Index” from Transparency International39 ranking from 0 to 10
( a c t u a l l yw eu s et h eo p p o s i t eo ft h es t a n d a r di n d e xt oh a v et h em a x i m u mv a l u ef o rt h em o s t
corrupted country).
• Common Language and Colonial Link: various sources (for colonial link, mainly summaries of
country history in Encyclopedias).
• Legal Variable: mainly La Porta et al. (1998), various sources for Missing countries.40
• Stock Market Returns: monthly data from 1990 to 2000 in US dollars from Martin and Rey (2006)
(World Bank and Bloomberg) and Global Financial Data.
• Market Capitalization over GDP: Market capitalization over GDP in 2000 are from the Financial
Structure database of the Worldbank.
• Bilateral Nominal Exchange Rates: from the International Financial Statistics. Bilateral Nominal
Exchange Rate Volatility is calculated using monthly data over ﬁve years window.
• Fiscal Variables:I B F Do n l i n ep r o d u c t s( http://www.ibfd.org); Latin American Taxation Database,
European Taxation Database, Asia–Paciﬁc Taxation Database, Tax Treaties Database.
• Swedish data on bilateral asset holdings and capital outﬂows: Sveriges Riksbank (Balance of Pay-
ments Statistics).
• Swedish data on bilateral trade:S t a t i s t i c sS w e d e n .
A.2. Country list for data on world asset holdings
• Source Countries (i): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Hong-Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Singapore, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, South
Africa.
38 For some countries, namely France and UK, we know that around half of total securities are equities.
39 http://www.transparency.org.
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• Destination countries (j):
– Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Turkey;
– Asia: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand;
– Oceania: Australia, New Zealand;
– North America: Canada, United States;
– Central America and South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama;
– Africa: Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia.
Table 10
International banking assets breakdown by types of assets and sectors (in billions USD, 2001).
Total assets Loans and deposits Bonds and equities Loans and deposits (%) Bonds and equities (%)
Developed Europea 3487.3 2363.01 1 2 4 .26 7 3 3
North America 2387.51 6 8 4 .97 0 2 .57 0 3 0
Asia–Oceania 632.05 1 9 .01 1 3 .08 2 1 8
Emerging Africa 42.63 7 .35 .48 7 1 3
Asiab 255.42 1 3 .64 1 .78 3 1 7
Eastern Europe 142.21 1 4 .22 8 .18 0 2 0
South Americac 259.01 9 3 .36 5 .77 4 2 6
Financial centersd 1086.2 965.81 2 0 .58 9 1 1
Total 8292.36 0 9 1 .1 2201.27 3 2 7
Disaggregation by sector (%) Banking sector Public sector Corporate sector Unallocated
48 16 35 1
a Excluding Luxembourg, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
b Excluding Hong-Kong and Singapore.
c Excluding Panama.
d Hong-Kong, Luxembourg, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
A.3. Robustness checks with European Union dummies
Table 11
Gravity models on world asset holdings with source country ﬁxed-effects.
Equityij Bondij BankAssetij
(1) (2) (3)
euroj .586* .656* .705**
(.367) (.373) (.322)
euroij 1.292*** 1.486*** .819**
(.438) (.421) (.366)
Eurcomij −.335* .631** .168
(.209) (.264) (.177)
SWE-DNK-UKj .431 .683* .579*
(.330) (.391) (.353)
e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .766 .681 .701
e(F) 113.194 96.702 62.658
Robustness check with a EU dummy (Eurcomij) and a dummy for countries inside the EU but outside the euro. Standard
errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country. Regional
dummies of destination and control variables are included but not reported.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Idem, 5% level.
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Table 12
Gravity models on world asset holdings with source and destination country ﬁxed-effects.
Equityij Bondij BankAssetij
(1) (2) (3)
Tradeij .396*** .123 .346***
(.067) (.079) (.071)
Distanceij −.496*** −.722*** −.497***
(.094) (.119) (.127)
Legalij .185* .184 .445***
(.103) (.123) (.112)
CommonLangij .435*** .397** .416**
(.129) (.188) (.164)
euroij .748*** .800*** .103
(.199) (.222) (.174)
Eurcomij −.668*** .219 −.109
(.206) (.232) (.160)
e(N) 1034 1031 897
e(r2) .789 .716 .717
e(F) 663.111 292.182 220.488
R o b u s t n e s sc h e c kw i t ha nE Ud u m m y( E u r c o m ij). Standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors. Observations are
clustered within destination country.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Idem, 5% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.
Table 13
Gravity models on outﬂows from Sweden: robustness check with EU dummy (Eurcom).
purchaseequityijt purchaseequityijt purchasebondijt loanijt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDPijt 1.160*** 1.180*** .978*** 1.331***
(.138) (.101) (.109) (.147)
Retjt 1.089**
(.496)
Distanceij −.482 −.654** .034 −1.493***
(.408) (.328) (.400) (.380)
Tradeijt .636*** .493** .491* −.125
(.237) (.219) (.288) (.221)
FDIijt −.099 −.099 −.033 .255*
(.118) (.110) (.097) (.130)
ExchRateVolatilityijt .192 .342 −2.661*** −.007
(.527) (.439) (.519) (.552)
Corruptionjt −.341*** −.352*** −.102 −.074
(.130) (.117) (.135) (.146)
eurojt 1.201* 1.461*** .964*** 2.222***
(.627) (.414) (.352) (.529)
Eurcomij −.095 −.214 .068 2.020***
(.470) (.357) (.216) (.571)
Legalij 2.416*** 2.470*** 2.542*** 2.212**
(.869) (.581) (.701) (1.043)
FinCenterj 2.386*** 2.308*** 1.228** 2.137***
(.559) (.492) (.478) (.564)
TaxHaven j 1.125** 1.308*** −1.116*** 1.158**
(.446) (.418) (.325) (.538)
e(N) 766 1105 686 1442
e(r2) .776 .754 .738 .716
e(F) 71.379 56.146 134.794 58.837
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Idem, 5% level.
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A.4. Robustness checks with bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility
Table 14
Gravity models on world asset holdings with source country ﬁxed-effects.
Equityij Bondij BankAssetij
(1) (2) (3)
euroj .521* .822** .726**
(.270) (.333) (.291)
euroij .980*** 1.903*** .780**
(.300) (.382) (.306)
ExchRateVolij .287 −.024 −.041
(.162) (.168) (.116)
e(N) 920 885 755
e(r2) .775 .685 .714
e(F) 149.109 69.425 91.762
Robustness check with bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility (in log-) (ExchRateVolij). Standard errors in parentheses. Es-
timation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country. Regional dummies of destination
and control variables are included but not reported.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Idem, 5% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.
Table 15
Gravity models on world asset holdings with source and destination country ﬁxed-effects.
Equityij Bondij BankAssetij
(1) (2) (3)
euroij .296* .857*** .077
(.170) (.207) (.147)
ExchRateVolij −.058 −.257* .018
(.117) (.135) (.100)
e(N) 920 885 755
e(r2) .802 .727 .754
e(F) 815.858 386.762 309.243
Robustness check with bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility (in log-) (ExchRateVolij). Standard errors in parentheses. Robust
standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.
A.5. Robustness checks with data on international taxation
Table 16







euroij .925*** 1.919*** .771**
(.291) (.354) (.318)
euroj .661** 1.087*** .692**
(.283) (.365) (.305)
e(N) 793 835 863
e(r2) .805 .707 .703
e(F) 70.571 59.585 92.004
Standard errors in parentheses. Estimation with robust standard errors. Observations are clustered within destination country.
Regional dummies of destination are included but not reported.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Idem, 5% level.
*** Idem, 1% level.N. Coeurdacier, P. Martin / J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (2009) 90–113 113
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